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# COUNTER-DRUG WORKING GROUP



*REPORT ON THE*

# U.S. MARINE CORPS ROLE IN THE NATION'S COUNTER-DRUG EFFORT

JULY 1989

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SUBJECT

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ROLE IN THE  
NATION'S COUNTER-DRUG EFFORT

"MARDIS"

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 10 March 1989, The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps directed the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Policies and Operations Department to create an ad hoc Counter-Drug Working Group (CDWG). One of the tasks of the CDWG was to prepare a "think piece" on the future role of the Marine Corps in support of the forthcoming national drug control strategy.

This paper constitutes that "think piece." There are no recommendations herein, however, conclusions are presented as "thought provokers." If these conclusions are thought to be worthy of further study or implementation, the leadership of the Marine Corps will publish guidance to that effect.

The following is a summary of the conclusions, however, to understand the context from which they are drawn, it is recommended that Section V, CONCLUSIONS be read in its entirety.

1. Counter-narcotics supply-side roles will require Marines to provide DETs, MTTs, DFTs, TATs, and SIAFs in numerous scenarios--many of which will not be amphibious in nature and may require Marines to perform in support of MILGP commanders, JTF commanders, Army component commanders, etc.
2. Marine planners and operators must learn to "think small" in support of the nation's counter-narcotics effort. The MAGTF (MEU, MEB, MEF) may not be the force of choice in this environment. It is time to investigate the deployment of a MAGTF "less than a MEU" in the Caribbean on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. A Marine Expeditionary Combat Team (MECT) with a reinforced rifle company (GCE), aviation DET (ACE), combat service support element (CSSE) and command element (CE) may be the required force. If desirable, this Caribbean MECT could be trained and designated special operations capable. In support of the "jointness" movement, it might be prudent to turn the MECT over to CINCSOC for employment.
3. There is a requirement for a Joint Planners/Operations Manual which depicts CMC Joint Planning Guidance. This Manual or Handbook should ensure that all Marine planners and operators (CINC, JTF, component and MEF levels) analyze every "tasker" in terms of what is best for the nation, the supported CINC, and the Corps, in that order. It should outline when a MAGTF is the preferred force and under what conditions we should provide DETs, MTTs, TATs, SIAFs, etc. Furthermore, the Manual must acknowledge that the traditional Navy/Marine command and control arrangements are not appropriate in all LIC scenarios (particularly counter-narcotics). Even our preference to fight as MEFs will not always fit in the CINC's concept (although it should in all global scenarios), particularly in LIC (counter-narcotics) where the requirement is to "think small."



4. Marine Corps support for the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and host nation forces should focus on the Caribbean Basin and South America. Riverine operations are an area deserving of Marine Corps attention. CG, MCCDC has been directed to complete a study to determine the Corps' capabilities and limitations therein (POA&M is at Appendix 7).

5. In the near term and in coordination with the JCS, Navy, and LANTCOM planners, it may be prudent to increase naval presence in the Caribbean by "borrowing" from the Mediterranean ARG/MEU (SOC). The Caribbean MECT could be the long term solution for Caribbean presence.

6. In spite of Army reluctance to do so, the Marine Corps should support the U.S. Border Patrol by scheduling joint training and surveillance operations along the southwest border utilizing available Bureau of Land Management and National Forest acreage. In addition, the Corps should provide Intelligence Officers on a TAD basis to develop operational intelligence fusion centers at Border Patrol sector headquarters.

It is the hope of the CDWG that sufficient definition exists herein (even without the Office of National Drug Control Policy national strategy) for CG, MCCDC to develop applicable concepts to include a Campaign Plan for Marine Corps counter-narcotics operations, if so directed by the leadership of the Marine Corps.



## SECTION I

### INTRODUCTION

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 89 clearly moves the Department of Defense toward a more active role in the U.S effort to counter drug abuse. Specific provisions require that the Department of Defense serve as the single lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States and integrate the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States into an effective communications network. To implement the above, the Secretary of Defense, has designated four supported CINCs (Appendix 1) to accomplish the DoD tasks. CINCLANT and CINCPAC have established Joint Task Force Four (JTF-4) and Joint Task Force Five (JTF-5), respectively, to direct their counter-drug efforts, while CINCNORAD and CINCSO have relied on existing structure with additional personnel augmentation. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel (Drug Policy and Enforcement) (DASD/FM&P (DP&E)) remains the Department of Defense (DoD) coordinator between the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the military departments.

The framework for the national structure to support the President's anti-drug strategy is outlined in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690 of Nov 18, 1988). The Act established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) which is headed by Dr. William J. Bennett (Appendix 2). As Director, Dr. Bennett is tasked to establish policies, objectives, and priorities for the National Drug Control Program;

promulgate the national drug control strategy; coordinate and oversee the implementation of the strategy; make recommendations to the President on drug control matters; and consult with state and local governments on drug issues.

During the first week of March 1989, it was clear that with the confirmation of Dr. Bennett, unprecedented crime rates in the nation's capital and a flurry of activity on Capitol Hill as well as in the Pentagon, DoD's role in the nation's counter-drug effort would increase. Speculation about DoD's future role exceeded the mandated detection and monitoring and included direct action in supply reduction in the Andean Ridge countries, utilization of military brigs to relieve prisoner overflow, loan of military lawyers to prosecute cases in civil courts and even the employment of uniformed servicemen in our nation's cities. These discussions convinced the leadership of the Marine Corps to take a hard look at our present position and future capability to support this rapidly expanding effort.

In order to be proactive and to rationally think through the Marine Corps capability to support the forthcoming national strategy, on 10 March 1989, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) directed the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Policies and Operations to formulate a General Officer Counter-Narcotics Steering Committee to advise the leadership of the Marine Corps with regard to the Corps capability to support the developing strategy. In addition, the ACMC directed that an ad hoc Counter-Drug Working Group (CDWG) be assembled. One of the

tasks of the CDWG was to prepare a "think piece" on the future role of the Marine Corps in support of the national drug control strategy.

In spite of concerted efforts to get a glimpse of the strategy during formulation, Bennett's staff has kept a tight lid on its contents. Occasional peeks are received through media disclosures but the reliability of these sources of information is suspect.

Nevertheless, this study attempts to look at the future role of the Corps in what is our "best guess" as to the direction of the national strategy and DoD's role therein. Its primary focus is on supply-side initiatives in the Caribbean, Latin America and along the southwest border between Mexico and the United States. There is no discussion nor conclusions with regard to initiatives in Iran, Burma, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan due to our limited presence and the political realities therein.

Furthermore, research conducted by the CDWG supports an early conclusion that demand-side initiatives are the key to resolving the problem. However, demand-side initiatives are the most difficult for the Marine Corps to effect due in part to its small size relative to the population. Hence, our conclusions will focus on supply-side initiatives. Since this paper is a "think piece" vice a staff study, there are no recommendations and the conclusions are to be viewed as "thought provokers." If any of the conclusions herein are perceived to be worthy of further study or implementation, the leadership of the Marine Corps will publish decisions and/or taskers as appropriate.



## SECTION II

### ASSUMPTIONS

1. Congress will demand increased DoD support to the counter-drug effort, necessitating greater Marine Corps participation and resources.
2. There will be no near-term change in the statutes prohibiting direct DoD participation in search, seizure, and arrest.
3. Congress will not significantly increase USMC budgetary allocation to support the counter-drug effort.
4. Based on geographic location, political considerations and disposition of Marine Corps forces, limited opportunities exist for Marine Corps support to counter-narcotics efforts in Iran, Burma, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
5. The importation of illicit drugs across U.S. borders is a national sovereignty issue affecting the security and the health and welfare of our populace.

### SECTION III

#### FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. There are 18.6 million marijuana users, 6 million cocaine users, and 500 thousand heroin addicts in the U.S. ("Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report", GAO, p-15).

2. One hundred percent of the heroin, cocaine, and 75% of the marijuana used in the United States is imported from abroad ("National Drug Policy Board, Progress Report 1987," p. 29).

3. Mexico is the number one producer of heroin, the number two producer of marijuana, and a major transit point for cocaine ("International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," p. 10).

4. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S. Border Patrol) is the principal interdicting force for drugs entering the U.S. along the southwest border between the ports-of-entry ("National Drug Policy Board, Progress Report 1987," p. 33).

5. Interdiction is not likely to reduce significantly the availability of cocaine and marijuana below current levels. In the long-term, reduction of the demand for drugs is the crucial element in the federal government's effort to reduce drug abuse ("Drug Control," GAO report to congressional requesters, p. 17).

6. The Posse Comitatus Act was passed in 1878 to end the use of federal troops in enforcing civil law in the south during reconstruction. It does not apply to the Navy or Marine Corps as written (Title 18 U.S.C. section 1385). SECNAVINST 5820.7A and

DoD Directive 5525.5 apply the prohibitions of the Posse Comitatus Act to the Navy and Marine Corps as a matter of policy.

7. The Mansfield amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically prohibits any officer or employee of the United States from engaging or participating in any direct police arrest action in a foreign country with respect to narcotics control efforts (Appendix 4). The law does not prohibit an officer or employee from assisting foreign officers who are effecting an arrest (Title 22 U.S.C., sec 2291 (C)).

8. DoD Directive 5525.5, Enclosure (4) restricts the direct use of military personnel in the following circumstances:

(a) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

(b) A search or seizure.

(c) An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

(d) For surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators or interrogators.

9. The Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for support requests for DoD personnel in numbers greater than 50 or for more than 30 day periods (DoD Directive 5525.5 of 15 January 1986).

10. Service Secretaries are the approving authority for requests that involve assignment of less than 50 personnel for 30 days or less (DoD Directive 5525.5 of 15 January 1986).

11. Military personnel are prohibited from direct



participation in OCONUS counter-drug operations without prior approval from host country, SECSTATE and SECDEF (SECDEF letter of 26 Sep 1988).

12. The Marine Corps manpower authorizations for the defense attache system include five officers and one SNCO in the LATAM region: Mexico (Maj/02); Jamaica (LtCol/02); Guatemala (Maj/02); El Salvador (LtCol/02, GySgt/02); Dominican Republic (LtCol/02) (Defense Attache Roster, November 1988).

13. One hundred percent of the coca production in the world comes from Peru (65%), Bolivia (28%), Colombia (6%), and Ecuador (1%). Production for 1987 equalled 158,300 metric tons (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/Force Management & Personnel (Drug Policy & Enforcement)).

14. The lead agency for maritime interdiction of illegal drugs outside the 12 mile limit is the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Customs Service is responsible for interdiction at the POEs. The Border Patrol is responsible for land interdiction between the ports of entry (POEs). The U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard are jointly responsible for air interdiction ("National Drug Policy Board, Progress Report, 1987," p. 30).

15. There are 20 Border Patrol sectors in the continental U.S. Nine sectors lie on the southwest land border with Mexico (INS Briefing of 24 March 1989 and Appendix 3).

16. The Border Patrol has approximately 4,000 agents, of which approximately 3,500 are assigned to the 2000-mile U.S./Mexican border. Additionally, there are nearly 3,000

sensors implanted in the border region. Nevertheless, shortages of personnel, sensors and night observation devices coupled with the rugged terrain along the southwest border make drug interdiction between the POEs extremely onerous (The Border War on Drugs, p. 37 and Immigration and Naturalization Service Brief of 24 Mar 1989).

17. Much of the terrain along the southwest border of the U.S. varies from desert plains to forested mountains and valleys and is sparsely populated (CDWG Trip Report, Southwest Border of 18 Apr 1989 (C)).

18. The U.S. Border Patrol does not possess an operational intelligence fusion capability at the station, sector, or regional level (CDWG Trip Report, Southwest Border of 18 April 89).

19. U.S. Border Patrol agents possess considerable skills in sign-cutting (detection), tracking and counter-tracking which are useful for Marine ground units and can be acquired during joint training (CDWG Trip Report, Southwest Border of 18 April 89).

20. A shortfall exists in U.S. Border Patrol training for agents in the following areas: land navigation/map reading; medical; explosive ordnance disposal; hand-to-hand combat; riot control agent training; intelligence collection, production, and dissemination; helicopter operations; scouting and patrolling, communications, and camouflage and concealment (CDWG Trip Report, Southwest Border of 18 April 1989).

21. The U.S. Army has conducted two surveillance/training operations on the southwest border in support of the U. S. Border Patrol and U.S. Customs Service. Operation Groundhog used ground-based radars to track ground targets across the border. During the 10 months this training was conducted, over 1000 targets were tracked resulting in 372 apprehensions. Field commanders comments indicated the quality of training significantly enhanced readiness by increasing real-world surveillance capability. Operation Hawkeye successfully used OV-1 aircraft to image targets in the border area vicinity of Fort Huachuca, AZ (Sealing The Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction, p. 53).

22. The DoD is the lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs (National Defense Authorization Act, FY 89, Sec 1102).

23. The Secretary of Defense receives reimbursement from the LEAs for DoD support unless the support is provided in the normal course of military training or operations, or such support results in a benefit that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from normal military operations or training (Title 10, U.S.C., sec 377).

24. DoD agencies may provide to Federal, State, or local LEAs any information collected during the normal course of military training or operations that may be relevant to a violation of law (Title 10, U.S.C., sec 371(a)).

25. When planning and executing military training or



operations, Services must take into consideration the information needs of LEAs - to the maximum extent practical (Title 10, U.S.C., sec 371(b)).

26. Intelligence information held by any military Service in the Department of Defense that is relevant to drug interdiction must be provided promptly to appropriate LEAs (Title 10, U.S.C., sec 371(c)).

27. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a DEA sponsored organization that manages a world-wide data base on drug smuggling routes, individuals, organizations, equipment, and seizures. Consolidated and evaluated intelligence information is disseminated to appropriate agencies upon request. EPIC is manned by representatives from nine federal agencies (The Border War on Drugs, pp. 42-43).

28. "Supply Reduction" means any enforcement activity that is intended to reduce the supply or use of drugs in the U.S. and abroad, including:

(a) International drug control

(b) Foreign and domestic drug enforcement

intelligence

(c) Interdiction

(d) Domestic drug law enforcement

(Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, sec 1010)

29. "Demand Reduction" means any activity, other than enforcement, that is intended to reduce the demand for drugs, including:

- (a) Drug abuse education
- (b) Prevention
- (c) Treatment
- (d) Research
- (e) Rehabilitation

(Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, sec 1010)

30. Fifteen Human Resource Specialists (MOS 9680) and 65 school-trained counselors (MOS 8538) are in the Marine Corps (Headquarters Master File of 19 May 1989).

31. The percentage of military personnel, DoD-wide, who reported their use of any illegal drug during the survey period (30 days prior to the response) decreased from 27.6% in 1980 to 4.8% in 1988 ("The 1988 Worldwide Survey of Substance Abuse and Health Behaviors Among Military Personnel", Research Triangle Institute, 1988, p. 7).

32. The U.S. Navy provides residential and in patient rehabilitation programs (Level III) for dependent substance abusers through four Alcohol Rehabilitation Centers (ARCs) and 21 Alcohol Rehabilitation Departments (ARDs) associated with Naval hospitals. Program costs are \$2,523 for ARCs and \$4,659 for ARDs per patient. Average duration of treatment period is 40 days ("Cost Benefit Study of the Navy's Level III Alcohol Rehabilitation Program, Caliber Associates, 1989, p. iv).

33. The overall Level III program success rate for drug users is 38%. A successful rehabilitation is defined as a Level III participant who (1) completed the program, (2) completed the

term of enlistment, (3) was recommended for reenlistment, and (4) experienced no future drug-related incidents in that period ("Cost Benefit Study of the Navy's Level III Alcohol Rehabilitation Program", Caliber Associates, 1989, p. iii).



## SECTION IV

### DISCUSSION

1. General. It is the objective of the U.S. government to create a drug-free America by 1995 according to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. To achieve this goal the Congress has created the Office of National Drug Control Policy and tasked it to develop a National Drug Control Strategy. The strategy is due to Congress during September 1989. Public Law 100-690 (Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988) outlines the strategy requirements to include: comprehensive, long-range goals for reducing drug abuse; short-term objectives; identification of resources to be allocated between supply reduction and demand reduction; and review of state and local drug control activities to ensure the U.S. pursues a well-coordinated program at all levels of government. Additionally, the strategy must discuss the U.S. anti-drug effort in terms of supply, demand, treatment and rehabilitation, research, and intelligence.

Since the national strategy will not be completed until September 1989, it is arduous to address future roles of the Marine Corps in support of the national strategy without some speculation as to its direction. Nevertheless, it is possible to project tentative roles for the Corps unless dramatic shifts from the existing National Drug Policy Board Strategy of 1988 should occur and this is not anticipated.

CDWG research has revealed considerable concern among the Marine officer corps with regard to the future role of the Corps

in the nation's counter-drug effort. Most agree that our capabilities lay primarily on the supply-side of the problem. Yet a review of the U.S. Southern Command Counter-Narcotics Strategy coupled with discussions with JCS-J3 Action Officers (AOs) and U.S. Atlantic Command planners reveal little insight as to the capabilities of Marines to influence solution of the supply-side problem, particularly in the Caribbean and Latin America. Some are quick to point out the paucity of Marines in key operations and plans billets at the JCS, unified commands and key federal agencies involved in the counter-drug effort. There does appear to be a tendency to overlook the capabilities of the Marine Corps in favor of Army Special Operations Forces (SOF), particularly in Latin America (LATAM) where there exists an Army CINC with in-place Army and SOF components as well as Army Military Group (MILGP) commanders in Colombia and Bolivia.

It is clear that in order to support host nation governments in source countries with DoD assets, CINC and component planners must "think small." As in other Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) scenarios, too large a U.S. military presence can prove counter-productive to the objective of the host nation government and create concern with regard to national sovereignty. In spite of our efforts to do so, the CDWG was unsuccessful in discerning realistic roles for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MEU, MEB, MEF) without significantly altering the status quo with regard to present statutes and political realities. However, there are roles for small independent action forces (SIAFs), DETs, Mobile

Training Teams (MTTs), Deployments for Training (DFTs), and Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) from MAGTFs.

Discussions with officers from other Services revealed a perception, although subtle (particularly among Army officer planners and operators), that Marines are more concerned with the protection of MAGTF employment doctrine and historic command and control arrangements than with satisfying the tasking/desires of the CINC. The implication was that "it's easier to use the Army than to wrestle with the idiosyncracies of the Marines!" Such a perception, valid or not, is having an unfavorable affect on the Commandant's efforts to promote the Corps' capabilities, particularly in low intensity conflict.

The MAGTF concept is clearly an enviable doctrine. Its inherent flexibility renders it the centerpiece of our warfighting strategy. However, dogmatic adherence to the concept when it is not required/desired by a CINC may lead to a perception of inflexibility. For some counter-narcotics missions, the MAGTF may not be the force of choice. Some have opined that whenever we put a group of Marines together - we create a MAGTF. However, two to four helicopters to support Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) eradication operations or a four man reconnaissance team teaching/demonstrating long range patrolling in Bolivia does not constitute a MAGTF. It may be better to continue to promote the MAGTF as our warfighting doctrine but to acknowledge that there are situations/scenarios in LIC (and in this case, counter-narcotics) where we will employ

teams/ elements/detachments of Marines and their equipment in configurations less than a MAGTF.

It may be time to look at a fourth type of MAGTF--one which is smaller than a MEU. A permanent or semi-permanent Marine Expeditionary Combat Team (MECT) commanded by a Col/LtCol and a small staff with a reinforced rifle company (GCE), aviation DET (ACE), command element (CE) and combat service support element (CSSE) might provide the required/desired Caribbean presence. This MECT would need the capability to support MTT, DFT and TAT taskings. Hence, the mission and training would vary from what one normally envisions for a MAGTF. This MECT could be trained to be special operations capable.

Indications are that Dr. Bennett's Andean Ridge interdiction strategy will include closure of the Andean Ridge air corridors followed by riverine interdiction of the remaining LOCs to cut the coca traffic. Such a strategy will produce requirements for training in riverine operations in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Marines should be ready to support this requirement. Riverine operations are integral to most LIC scenarios and the Marine Corps must nail down its capabilities and limitations therein.

The remainder of the discussion will focus directly on the components of the ONDCP's anticipated national strategy: supply, demand, treatment and rehabilitation, research, and intelligence.

2. Supply. Since the United States produces no heroin or cocaine, and only 25% of the marijuana consumed within its borders, a major objective in reducing drug use is to restrict



the flow of drugs across our borders and into the hands of potential users. Operations to reduce the amount of drugs crossing the U.S. borders can be broadly categorized as eradication, surveillance (detection and monitoring), and interdiction.

Eradication efforts are defined as those actions taken at the source to stop either growth or production of illegal narcotics. Eradication actions against cocaine, for example, include eliminating coca plants, confiscating precursor chemicals, or destroying chemical laboratories.

Surveillance is defined as the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Detection is to determine the presence of aircraft, vessels, or persons attempting to introduce illegal drugs into the U.S. Monitoring activities include tracking, electronically or otherwise, a suspect aircraft, vessel, or person. Generally, DoD monitoring ends when LEA assets are suitably positioned to assume responsibility.

Interdiction includes those actions taken to disrupt the flow or movement of the illegal drugs from the time they leave the source countries until they reach the hands of the user. Interdiction includes land, aerial, and maritime intercepts of drug traffickers, or actions which prevent the intended transfer of illegal drugs from taking place.

As almost 100 percent of the world's coca production is

from the Andean Ridge countries, eradication efforts must be focused in Colombia, Bolivia, and particularly in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru. The governments of Peru and Bolivia have not permitted a substantial U.S. military presence to date. Current efforts in South America involve Special Forces "A" Teams in a training role in Bolivia and very limited U.S. advisor assistance in Colombia. Bolivia currently allows more direct DOD participation than either Colombia or Peru. U.S. Army Special Forces "A" teams are participating in eradication efforts by training and advising Bolivian units and DEA Special Agents engaged in such operations. Because of the existing USA/SOF orientation in South America (both in SOUTHCOM and in the MILGPS), U.S. Marine Corps support to Andean Ridge countries has been limited. Additional efforts by the Marine Corps in this region should concentrate on continued participation in Joint/Combined training exercises, developing MTTs relative to counter-narcotics operations and host military needs/requirements, and generally, those activities that allow for more interface with Latin American military counterparts. A viable means to foster a closer relationship with LATAM counterparts is a USMC/LATAM Sponsorship Program. The program is approved by CINCSOUTH and implementation by the FMFs should be forthcoming. Under the program, U.S. Marines will work with the six recognized Marine Corps of South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela) on various initiatives in an effort to assist them in their professional development while increasing USMC regional knowledge

and enhancing resident LIC experience.

Regardless of the role DOD/USMC forces ultimately play, there are only two means by which U.S. military forces may become involved on foreign soil, both of which are subject to the limitations of the Mansfield Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Appendix 4). The first is by a direct request of the host nation through the State Department (U.S. Ambassador) for military assistance. The second means is more subtle, but still requires host nation approval. In this case, a U.S. agency already involved in the host country may request DoD support for its own operations. As the LATAM land mass (with the exception of Mexico) falls in the SOUTHCOM area of operations (AOR), in recent years, planning, training, and operational commitments in these countries have been U.S. Army oriented. As noted previously, the current commander of SOUTHCOM is an Army officer; the J-3 is Army; the ground component commander is Army; the SOF component commander is Army; and two of three MILGPs in the region are headed by Army officers. It follows then that current U.S. military efforts in the Andean Ridge countries would be supported primarily by U.S. Army (SOF) forces.

Interdiction efforts have been primarily focused in the Caribbean basin and along the southern border of the U.S. The Caribbean is patrolled primarily by U.S. Coast Guard and Navy task forces and U.S. Customs air interdiction assets. Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT) has been ongoing since April 1982. This operation includes six U.S. Army helicopters stationed

in the Bahamas to conduct interdiction sorties in support of the Coast Guard. These H-60 Blackhawks operate on a 24 hour basis throughout the Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos Islands with Coast Guard HH-3s. Their mission is to deliver U.S. or host nation law enforcement agents to the location of intercepted drug smugglers.

The U.S. Navy provides approximately 250 ship-days per quarter for interdiction support in the region. Typical operations include 6-8 ships (80% USN) varying from Naval Reserve Force ships to Aegis cruisers. Past task forces have also included amphibious ships (LPDs). Surface forces are supported by Navy P-3s, E-2Cs, and Coast Guard C-130s and HU-25 intercept aircraft. Typical operations run approximately 3-5 weeks. An estimated sixty percent of all seizures in the Caribbean are the result of these joint operations. U.S. Marine participation in the past has included one UH-1N for surveillance support and numerous OV-10 detection and monitoring sorties using the FLIR. Recent U.S. Coast Guard after action reports from these joint operations identify FLIR and gyro stabilized binoculars as critical items for aviation (particularly helicopter) assets. On-board self-contained navigation equipment was also mentioned as significant. The After Action Report for Operation Explorer (17 March-6 April 1989), an operation similar to OPBAT indicated the Coast Guard will seek U.S. Army AH-58Ds for future operations. It is noteworthy that this single operation resulted in 19 arrests, 2 seized vessels, and 77,644 pounds of marijuana confiscated.

Training benefits can be derived from USMC aviation support



to this type of operation. All aspects of ship-board operations, to include use of night vision goggles, would readily enhance warfighting skills as well as positively affect Training and Readiness (T&R) Syllabus percentages. Some T&R currency requirements would lapse during extended sea periods (e.g., TERF), but overall pilot skill levels would increase. This would be particularly true if two or more helicopters were assigned to this mission. Operating in this sea-based mode clearly falls within the roles and missions of the Marine Corps. Furthermore, while it remains to be seen how much money will be available for equipment purchases or modifications in support of the counter-drug effort, justification could be compiled for FLIR and long-range navigation upgrades for USMC aircraft employed in the effort.

As more effort and assets are directed toward the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime targets in the Caribbean, an increase in drug smuggling activity can be expected along the southwest land border. The primary responsibility for interdiction along the southwest border falls to U.S. Customs Service at the POEs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Border Patrol) between the POEs. In one sector along the Texas/Mexico border, the number of illicit narcotics seizures doubled from 1987 to 1988 and the last two years totals are 7 times the 1986 seizures. On 8 June 1989, in the Coronado National Forest south of Tucson, two Border Patrol agents intercepted three pickup trucks carrying 2,645 pounds of cocaine with a "street" value of over \$84,000,000!

POE operations (U.S. Customs Service) are directly associated with search and seizure procedures and therefore, do not readily lend themselves to DoD active duty participation. However, the National Guard under Title 32 authority is now assisting in searches and seizures at POEs. Although DoD is the lead agency for detection and monitoring, interception of suspect aerial targets crossing the border is the responsibility of the U.S. Customs Service. Border patrol operations between the POEs include detection and monitoring, interdiction, search, seizure, and apprehension of drug smugglers. While there are some DoD prohibitions articulated in DoD Directive 5525.5, USMC participation in detection and monitoring (surveillance) while training the LEAs is not prohibited by law nor directives and is compatible with the capabilities of the Corps. Furthermore, Title 10 of the U.S. Code specifies that to the maximum extent practical, Services must take the information needs of the law enforcement agencies into consideration when planning and executing training or operations. Title 10 goes on to stipulate that the Services may provide law enforcement agencies with any information gained during the normal course of training and operations that could pertain to drug smuggling activities.

Small Marine units with a covert surveillance capability, both day and night, could readily provide valuable information to the Border Patrol and Customs Service regarding surface and aerial smuggling activity while enhancing their warfighting skills by training/operating against "real" targets along the

Southwest border. A variety of Marine units could benefit from this concept to include: SCAMP, STA, Recon, RPV Co, fire support teams, MACS personnel, and infantry units. Helicopter assets could also be incorporated into the training scenarios. Aside from MedEvac, helicopter training could include: NVG operations, repelling, radio relay, visual reconnaissance, and command and control. The proximity of several military bases, diverse terrain, numerous tracts of Bureau of Land Management acreage and national forests, and realistic training scenarios would make the southwest border an attractive training option.

Additionally, USMC and Border Patrol expertise in specific subject areas could be shared in a joint training program between Marines and Border Patrol agents. Stated deficiencies in Border Patrol training are coincidentally areas where Marines have considerable knowledge. Conversely, Border Patrol agents possess specific skills in sign cutting (detection), tracking and counter-tracking that could be beneficial to Marines.

Of particular concern is the need for operational intelligence. Currently, each Border Patrol sector possesses an intelligence section, but its focus is on administrative record keeping, statistical analysis, and supply of maps and charts. Little operational intelligence is produced and disseminated to field agents and little evidence exists of any analysis being conducted as the result of ongoing operations (sensor activation, scouting and patrolling, sign-cutting, rancher interrogations, etc.).

The intelligence collection capability of each Border Patrol agent is significant, but there is no fusion center to collate the data at the sector level. Interaction with the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) appears to be limited. Marine Corps expertise in this area is considerable and readily transferable to the Border Patrol.

While considerable evidence concludes that interdiction operations will probably not appreciably reduce the quantity of cocaine and marijuana entering the country, this same analysis indicates that military participation does have an impact on drug trafficking. Aside from reducing the quantities reaching the user, interdiction by U.S. military forces sends a visible signal that the U.S. government is "tough" on drugs. Previous strategies of passive actions have failed miserably. The Congress is increasingly anxious to demonstrate a convincing resolve against traffickers. In order to make a significant dent in the supply availability, the DoD needs a legal mandate for military operations and the use of force. It remains to be seen whether the nation is willing to go that far.

3. Demand. Demand reduction requires actions to de-glamorize the use of drugs through counter-value education. All four Services participate to some degree in this effort. In the Marine Corps, the Recruiting Service employs an awareness program (posters, videotape, and Public Service Announcements) to bring the anti-drug message to the high schools. The Reserve establishment has provided support to the "Campaign Drug Free"



pilot program designed by the DASN (RA). There are other ways the Corps can contribute. The loan of Marine prosecuting attorneys on a case-by-case basis to expedite trials in federal courts overwhelmed with drug cases is an example.

From a Marine Corps perspective, demand-side programs should be directed at active duty Marines and prospective Marines from the recruiting market segment. Programs directed at Marines and prospective Marines will have an ancillary and complimentary affect on the illegal drug problem in the general population.

DoD efforts to curb drug use and abuse in active duty forces have been noteworthy. DoD figures show a dramatic decline in users from approximately 27 percent in 1980 to a present-day rate of 4.8%. Marine Corps statistics show an even more dramatic decline from 37% in 1980 to 4% in 1988 (Appendix 5)! This success is, at least in part, attributed to the mandatory urinalysis program and the Corps' zero tolerance attitude. Analysis also indicates that increasing the frequency of urinalysis testing will further decrease the usage rate. As long as the program remains in place there is little to indicate a reversal in this downward trend. A consequence of implementing a more aggressive urinalysis screening program in the recruiting process would be to effectively reduce the number of potential "drug-free" recruits from the eligible population. Coupled with a declining population in the target age group for recruitment, this further reduction may result in increased manpower and budgeting requirements in the recruiting force to meet Marine Corps accession goals. An

alternative may be to accept more drug-use waivers, but such a policy would portend disciplinary problems reminiscent of the '60s and early '70s.

The Marine Corps desire to acquire adequate numbers of recruits from a drug-free population segment requires an emphasis on education and demonstration of the anti-drug posture of the Marine Corps. This goal takes on a new perspective in view of a recent National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) survey which indicated over 25 percent of the high school population polled had used illegal drugs in the previous 30 days! The current Marine Corps awareness campaign to bring an anti-drug message to the nation's high schools and recruiting market addresses this dilemma, but its effectiveness is difficult to measure. To facilitate these efforts and to assist FMF commanders awareness programs, it may be feasible to establish a central repository of all Marine Corps drug related materials to include awareness information such as that produced by NIDA, briefs, tapes, films etc., tailored to specific audiences.

Several socialization programs are in are operation today that provide education, drug counseling, shock incarceration, and behavior modification to youthful offenders. While many are styled after military training models, there are no DoD operated programs of this nature established on a permanent basis. Because these programs often cross the legal boundaries between military roles and law enforcement agency roles, it is difficult to design a DoD sponsored/accepted curriculum. Questions of authority,

liability, apprehension, and punishment are just a few of the serious concerns these programs present to the Services. For these reasons, Marine Corps sponsorship of such programs must be viewed with skepticism. In a supporting role, the Marine Corps does have specific expertise in areas that could contribute to these programs. Troop handlers, instructors, Human Resource Specialists, trained substance abuse counselors, etc., could provide support to subject programs on a case by case basis.

One socialization program designed by Col P.G. Collins, USMC (Ret.) is worthy of mention in some detail (Appendix 6). The "National Junior Leaders Program" focuses on the 16-20 year-old, underprivileged, poorly educated youth as the target population. It encompasses a four phase curriculum that could last up to three years, depending on the direction the individual takes in the final phase. The key aspect that differentiates this from other "boot camp" or shock incarceration programs is that participants in the military sponsored portions of the program are not convicted criminals.

By modifying the existing Marine Corps boot camp syllabus, selected juveniles would be disciplined and closely supervised while undertaking remedial educational training, confidence-building courses, leadership training, etc. Phase I of the program would last approximately nine weeks. The Marine Corps would be the lead agency in this initial phase. Following this nine week period of indoctrination with the Marine Corps, participants would spend six weeks in a follow-on phase at other

sites. This "Outward Bound" type phase would enforce the skills learned at the Marine Corps depots while emphasizing socialization skills.

Phase II of the National Juniors Leader Program would shift the Marine Corps into a supporting role. Although discipline would still be stressed, the close supervision characteristic of Phase I would be reduced. Concepts such as Mr. William Holmberg's "Green Team", recreational/intramural athletic programs, and academic instruction would constitute the central theme of this phase with the Marine Corps providing facilities, equipment, and personnel support as required.

The third phase focuses on a return to society and offers a diversified program of instruction culminating in community college applications, labor union apprenticeships, guaranteed enlistment programs, etc. As with Phase II, this phase would be supported by the Marine Corps while other federal, state, and local agencies assumed the lead. Marine drug counselors and U.S. Navy Rehabilitation facilities could be made available to assist in this aspect of the program.

The final phase of the program includes community enhancement initiatives to better assist the community in the assimilation of the "junior leaders" back into society. This phase would run concurrently with the other three phases, as would a drug rehabilitation program for those in need of clinical help.

The ultimate goal of this over-arching program would be to



develop a productive U. S. citizen who is drug-free.

4. Treatment and Rehabilitation. The U.S. Navy currently provides inpatient rehabilitation at four Alcohol Rehabilitation Centers (ARCs) and 21 Alcohol Rehabilitation Departments (ARDs) associated with Naval hospitals. Success rate for this treatment, as measured by (1) program completion, (2) completed term of enlistment, (3) recommendation for reenlistment, and (4) no further drug related incidents in the period, is 38% for drug abusers. Navy ARCs and ARDs are currently operating at near capacity. The Marine Corps treatment and rehabilitation programs at unit and major command levels are generally screening and counselling in nature with limited treatment capabilities for the addicted patient. Hence, our ability to assist the national effort in terms of treatment and rehabilitation is extremely limited except when personnel and facility support to socialization programs is deemed appropriate.

5. Research. As a key element of the proposed national strategy, research and development funding will be increasingly applied to counter-drug efforts. The primary federal agency now involved in demand-side drug related research and development is the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), under the Department of Health and Human Services. NIDA's charter is to research drug abuse patterns in the U.S. and to develop treatment programs. To do this, Congress has allocated \$290 million for FY 89. The majority of this money is spent on nationwide surveys, medical research, grants, testing, and a national media campaign against

drug use.

By necessity, the Marine Corps role in R&D will be limited. The FY 90 allocation from U.S. Navy RDT&E funds will be \$249 million. This sum must support all USMC R&D efforts as well as "studies money" at the MAGTF Warfighting Center. Little if any resources for drug abuse research will be available without adversely affecting research and development programs for modernization of equipment necessary to maintain our readiness to fight - and win.

6. Intelligence. In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 18 April 1989, LTG Kelly, J-3, stated that intelligence efforts directed toward drug smugglers may be the most significant contribution DoD can make to the nation's war on drugs. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence goes on to say that it is the official DoD intelligence policy to provide all possible support to counter-narcotics activities consistent with the DoD mission, military preparedness, and the prudent management and application of DoD intelligence resources.

Marine Corps efforts in intelligence include a newly-formed Reserve Augmentation Unit (RAU) assigned to the Counter-Narcotics Training Detachment at DIA, numerous personnel assignments to the CINCs and other federal agencies in drug-related billets, and a limited SIGINT capability targeted against drug smugglers approaching the U.S. southern border. All of these efforts have had a measure of success and should be continued; however, since

the requirement for intelligence officers and SNCOs will probably continue to increase as DoD becomes more involved in the war on drugs, CMC Code (INT), must carefully scrutinize each requirement. Limited personnel assets and a continual need to keep these Marines trained, necessitates the allocation of Marines to those billets where they can enhance their intelligence skills while contributing to the national effort.

CINCSOUTH's intelligence exchange program with LATAM militaries appears to meet the above requirements. Many LATAM militaries seek U.S. assistance in training their intelligence forces and this would provide an excellent opportunity for Marines to train in a LIC scenario while providing the Marine Corps a cadre of personnel experienced/knowledgeable about the LATAM theater of operations. As this type of mission fits into the DoD role for intelligence support, it may qualify for General Defense Intelligence Program funding.

Any long term USMC support to the nation's counter-narcotics intelligence efforts must address the need for Spanish and Portuguese linguists and Foreign Area Officers (FAO). While there are over 4000 Marines with some proficiency in Spanish identified on the Headquarters Master File, there does not appear to be a directed effort to develop or utilize this talent. All Marines should take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) and those identified with a propensity for language adaptability should be required or encouraged to develop their skills at Marine Corps expense. Formal schools of appropriate length (TBS, AWS, and

C&SC) should provide classroom language training for qualified Marines.

Language training could be similar to electives but last the length of the course. Take home packages of cassettes should be available also. As part of a far-reaching plan, in addition to Defense Attache assignments, FAO duties, and specified joint billets, Marines thus trained would serve as MTT/DFT/TAT instructors, as liaison officers during combined exercises, participants in exchange programs, etc.

Intelligence support to the U.S. Border Patrol on the southwest border is another area where Marines can apply their tactical intelligence skills while gaining valuable real-world hands-on experience. As noted previously, the Border Patrol lacks an operational intelligence fusion capability. Marine intelligence officers could readily initiate an intelligence program that would maximize Border Patrol intelligence potential to assist in stopping the flow of drugs across the border by helping develop an S-2 arrangement at each Sector headquarters.



## SECTION V

### CONCLUSIONS

1. General. The following conclusions are designed to be "thought provokers" and should be viewed as logical findings which are presented for the leadership of the Marine Corps to reflect upon. They are not recommendations; however, research conducted by the CDWG indicates that these are all areas deserving a closer look. There is no effort in this study to provide a "laundry list" of all the things the Marine Corps has done or could do to support the so-called "drug war." In fact, many of the obvious previous accomplishments are omitted (e.g., equipment loans to the LEAS, training support to the DEA, manpower support to the CINCS, JTFs, etc). The primary focus in this study is on key supply-side roles which the leadership will be forced to consider in the years to come.

a. Demand-Side. The majority of the research conducted by the CDWG concludes that demand is the center of gravity of the nation's drug problem. However, due to the size of the Marine Corps relative to the population of the U.S. and the established roles and missions of the Corps, supply-side operations are more consistent with our capabilities. Therefore, other than the ongoing demand-side actions outlined in Section IV, limited support to socialization programs and the provision of human resource specialists and substance abuse counselors to external agencies, no new conclusions are offered with regard to demand reduction.

b. Supply-Side. Although supply-side roles are difficult to pin down without access to the national strategy, we have taken the liberty to outline some roles based on the assumptions depicted in Section II. Also discussed are some concerns with regard to a perception among some joint planners and operators that Marines are often inflexible with regard to employment and command and control issues. The conclusions are as follows:

(1) In spite of the positive efforts of our Commandant to communicate our capabilities, particularly in LIC, there is a tendency for CINCSOUTH to overlook the capabilities of the Marine Corps in LATAM in favor of Army and SOF components. This is clearly evident in his Counter-Narcotics Strategy of 1989. It is a known fact that we have no General Officer representation in SOUTHCOM. Furthermore, the Navy Component is probably the least influential of CINCSOUTH's four components (Army, Navy, Air Force and SOF).

In addition to the above, there are indications of a perception (particularly among Army planners and operators) that Marines are recalcitrant over adherence to the MAGTF employment concept even when a MAGTF (MEU, MEB, MEF) is not required/desired. Marine planners and operators must display greater planning and operating flexibility, particularly in LIC scenarios lest, an enviable MAGTF doctrine designed around the principle of flexibility become the agent of a CINC perception of inflexibility. Additionally, traditional Navy/Marine command relationships designed to support naval campaigns are not always

the right prescription in a LIC environment. This is particularly true for counter-narcotics operations. Counter-narcotics roles will require Marines to provide DETs, MTTs, DFTs, TATs and SIAFs in numerous scenarios--many of which will not be amphibious in nature and may require Marines in support of MILGP Commanders, CJTFs, Army Components, etc.

It is the understanding of the CDWG that efforts are ongoing to acquire better Marine representation at SOUTHCOM and NAVSO. However, it is insufficient to just gain representation; the Corps needs informed representation. Marine planners and operators need to better understand the nature of conflict on the LIC end of the spectrum. They must recognize that traditional naval command and control relationships don't always apply in LIC. Although this may sound like heresy--the MAGTF (MEU, MEB, MEF) is not always the force of choice in Caribbean and LATAM LIC scenarios. Marine planners and operators must recognize that the CINC has force requirements which are often inconsistent with the manner in which Marines would prefer to be employed, but we are not in a position to pick and choose. Ours is to support. If CINCSOUTH asks for a DET of two UH-1N aircraft for a two week period of ADMIN/LOG support to DEA or one recon team to teach long range patrolling to the Bolivian Army--we should be just as responsive as if he had requested a MEB to seize the Corinto Port Facility in Nicaragua. Anything less undermines our Commandant's efforts to convince the regional CINCs of our willingness to support their theater initiatives.

The Marine Corps has needed a Joint Planners/Operators Manual or Handbook for many years which talks to the above, among other deployment and employment initiatives/issues. Such a Manual should purport to emphasize the Corps "can-do" attitude such that any CINC perception of recalcitrance is overcome by enthusiastic Marine support. The Joint Planners/Operators Manual would be similar to the early 1980s Draft Planners Reference Manual produced by the Amphibious Warfare Study Group but never published. The Manual would be written by a team of officers with CINC, component, and MEF planning experience and would provide CMC planning guidance to Marine planners and operators. This Manual must clearly portray Marine roles in global and regional conflict (read LIC to include counter-narcotics) and must belay parochial concerns to the degree possible. It would encourage the Marine planner/operator to analyze every CINC "tasker" in terms of what is best for the nation, the supported CINC, and the Corps, in that order.

(2) Marine planners and operators must learn to "think small" in support of the nation's counter-narcotics effort. The MAGTF (MEU, MEB, MEF) may not be the force of choice in this environment. It is time to investigate the deployment and employment of a MAGTF "less than a MEU" in the Caribbean on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. The CDWG suggests a Marine Expeditionary Combat Team (MECT) composed of a reinforced rifle company (GCE), aviation DET (ACE), combat service support element (CSSE) and a command element (CE) (Col or LtCol Commander and a



small staff). This MECT would require unique skills and capabilities particularly with regard to the requirement to provide MTTs, DFTs and TATs in support of CINCLANT and CINCSOUTH taskings in the Caribbean and LATAM respectively. It will be necessary to coordinate early on with OPNAV concerning ship availability and the effect on deployment schedules, etc.

(3) Marine Corps support for LEAs and host nation forces should focus on the Caribbean Basin and South America.

(a) Support to USCG/USN operations in the Caribbean Basin closely parallels USMC roles and missions and can have a positive impact on U.S. interdiction efforts in the region.

(b) There is a role, yet to be determined for the Marine Corps in support of LATAM riverine interdiction operations. Insurgents in many LIC environments rely upon river LOCs, as do drug traffickers in LATAM. Riverine operations are part and parcel to LIC and the Marine Corps has yet to determine its niche therein. Doctrinal publications fail to clearly depict the Corps' capabilities and limitations in riverine operations. Nor do they outline the Corps' role vis-a-vis the Navy and the Army. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps has tasked CG, MCCDC to conduct a study to ascertain the above (POA&M is at Appendix 7).

(c) The SOUTHCOM strategy for LATAM depicts a key role for Special Forces as "trainers" of host nation LEAs and military units. Support is primarily in the form of MTTs, DFTs, and TATs. Marine units have comparable abilities in many areas

and can provide similar support, particularly in a sea-based mode when a visible U.S. military presence is not desired. Support can be ground or air and can enhance future efforts to cut the Andean Ridge air corridor, interdict riverine traffic, and/or support DEA eradication efforts through training or outright security operations.

(d) In the near term and in coordination with JCS, LANTCOM, and Navy planners, increased USN/USMC presence should be pursued in the Caribbean Basin by increasing ARG/MEU(SOC) sailing days and port visits. Additional Caribbean presence would be "borrowed" from the Mediterranean ARG/MEU(SOC) until such time as an additional MAGTF (MECT) with appropriate shipping could be established. If feasible and desirable, this "Caribbean" MECT could be designated special operations capable. As an additional thought and in support of the "jointness" movement, it might be prudent to turn this "Caribbean" MECT over to CINCSOC for employment.

(e) Support USN/USCG interdiction operations in the Caribbean by providing helicopter assets for surveillance missions. Fixed-wing (RF-4, C-130, and OV-10) assets could also be provided to assist in the detection and monitoring role, command and control, and limited logistics support. Both active and Reserve forces should contribute.

(f) A synopsis of Marine support to Caribbean and LATAM operations is as follows:

- o Joint Operations (sea based/amphibious)

- oo USCG
- oo USCS
- oo USN
- o Maritime and aerial surveillance
- o Security operations and training
- o Riverine operations
- o Long-range patrolling
- o Communications
- oo Secure voice
- oo SIGINT
- oo Non-line-of-sight connectivity

(4) Selective employment of DoD/USMC ground surveillance assets to observe the Southwest Border where there are gaps in Border Patrol coverage will be effective in reducing the flow of illicit drugs across the border.

(a) As air and maritime detection and monitoring, to include employment of USCS aerostat sensors, becomes more effective, increasing amounts of illicit narcotics will transit the southwest land border. This may already be occurring - witness the 2,456 pound cocaine seizure south of Tucson on 8 June 1989.

(b) Bureau of Land Management and national forest land along the southwest border will provide excellent training areas for scouting and patrolling, Observation Post (OP) selection and manning, night movement, camouflage and concealment, land navigation/map reading, helo operations, etc.

(c) Sign cutting (detection), tracking and counter-tracking skills taught by U.S. Border Patrol agents will enhance USMC warfighting skills.

c. Although staffed to provide intelligence, the Border Patrol Sector Chiefs lack an operational intelligence capability. Marine intelligence officers, TAD to various sectors, could provide them with expert advice to develop operational intelligence fusion centers. Training provided would include instruction in maintenance of intelligence situation maps, integration of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) input, analysis of sensor readouts, patrol briefing and debriefing procedures, etc.

d. Joint training and surveillance operations conducted with the Border Patrol could last from three to four weeks. Scouting and patrolling, OP selection and manning, etc., would be taught in the classroom during the first week followed by two to three weeks of hands-on practical application in the field vicinity of areas highly trafficked by drug smugglers. A detailed menu of joint training opportunities is as follows:


- o Joint training and surveillance operations
  - oo Land navigation/map reading
  - oo OP selection and occupation
  - oo Camouflage and concealment
  - oo Sensor employment and management
  - oo Medical training
  - oo Desert survival training




- o Intelligence support
- o Helicopter Operations
- o Communications Support
  - oo Secure Voice
  - oo SIGINT
  - oo Non-line-of-sight-connectivity
  - oo Brevity codes
- o Engineer support

2. It is the hope of the CDWG that sufficient definition exists herein (even without the ONDCP national strategy) for CG, MCCDC to develop applicable concepts to include a Campaign Plan, if so directed, per Col P. G. Collins', USMC briefing to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 7 March 1989.

COUNTER-DRUG WORKING GROUP



LTCOL J. H. BENSON



LTCOL R. M. FLANAGAN



MR. K. W. MIRMAK




UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5001

IN REPLY REFER TO

3000  
WF14  
6 Jul 89

From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (PP&O)  
Subj: EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IN RIVERINE OPERATIONS  
IN SUPPORT OF THE NATION'S COUNTER-DRUG EFFORT  
Ref: (a) CMC ltr 3000 CDWG of 17 May 1989 (C)  
Encl: (1) POA&M

1. In response to the reference, the enclosure is submitted.

  
W. R. ETZIRE

29 JUN 1989

POA&M

Subj: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF USMC FORCES IN SUPPORT  
OF RIVERINE DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

1. Proposed Action

a. CG MCCDC

(1) Develop the following operational concepts:

(a) USMC training of DEA/US Agency personnel in riverine operations to include coxswain and navigator training, scout swimmer employment and small unit tactics.

(b) USMC mobile training teams providing instruction to host nation (HN) counternarcotics (CN) forces in riverine operations to include coxswain and navigator training, scout swimmer employment and small unit tactics.

(c) USMC forces augmenting DEA/US Agency personnel.

(d) USMC forces augmenting HN counternarcotics forces to provide coxswains and navigators in support of CN riverine operations while mobile training teams provide instruction in small unit tactics.

(e) USMC task organized forces combined with DEA/US Agency forces to form an interagency joint task force for the conduct of CN riverine operations (may include strike personnel).

(f) USMC task organized forces combined with HN counternarcotics forces to form an international joint task force for the conduct of CN riverine operations.

(2) Provide an intelligence collection and dissemination plan for CN riverine operations. (Intelligence Center)

(3) Coordinate the development of POIs, for the training of DEA/US Agency and HN forces to include the establishment of training tasks, conditions and standards.

(4) Identify the linguist requirement to support each of the operational concepts listed in subparagraph (1) above.

b. CG MCRDAC

(1) Identify alternative small boat navigation devices that could be used in Latin American/South American CN riverine

Subj: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF USMC FORCES IN SUPPORT  
OF RIVERINE DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

operations. Systems should achieve accuracy of 100 meters. For each system considered, provide reliability, availability and maintainability information as well as procurement cost, integrated logistics support cost, operator and maintenance training costs, type, power supply, and availability of systems.

c. HQMC PP&O

(1) Provide policy guidance on the roles and missions of USMC forces in CN operations.

(2) Provide policy guidance on chain of command for USMC forces involved in support of DEA/US Agency or HN counter-narcotics forces.

(3) Provide guidance on the relationship of USMC forces involved in CN operations and the theatre CINC/country team.

(4) Provide detailed rules of engagement (ROE) for each of the operational concepts outlined in paragraph 1a(1).

Proposed milestones for accomplishment of tasks outlined in paragraph one.

3 Jul: -CG MCCDC forwards proposed POA&M to CMC (PP&O)

5 Jul: -CMC provides concurrence/nonconcurrence with POA&M

Jul: -CG MCCDC coordinates with FMF commanders

Jul: -Operational concepts for CG MCCDC review  
-Report on small boat navigation devices to CG MCCDC  
-POI recommendations from FMFs to CG MCCDC  
-Policy guidance on roles and missions to CG MCCDC  
-Chain of command guidance to CG MCCDC  
-Relationship to CINC/country teams to CG MCCDC

Jul: -Intel plan for CG MCCDC review

Aug: -POIs for CG MCCDC review  
-Linguist requirements reviewed by CG MCCDC  
-Rules of engagement to CG MCCDC


Aug: -CG MCCDC submits plan for CN riverine operations to CMC




Subj: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF USMC FORCES IN SUPPORT  
OF RIVERINE DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

5 Sep: -William Bennett (Drug CZAR) announces  
National Drug Strategy

# DOD CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR DETECTION/MONITORING




# OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY



\*TASKED BY DR. BENNETT TO WRITE THE  
NATIONAL STRATEGY BY 5 SEP 1989

# Border Patrol Sectors

(Sectors are identified by name of site of Border Patrol Headquarters)



○ Sectors with Automated Intrusion Detection System



(C) by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Amounts appropriated under this section are authorized to remain available until expended."

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

22 USC 2291a.

SEC. 504. (a) Section 482 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by inserting immediately before the period at the end of the first sentence " , \$40,000,000 for the fiscal year 1976, no part of which may be obligated for or on behalf of any country where illegal traffic in opiates has been a significant problem unless and until the President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that assistance furnished to such country pursuant to the authority in this chapter is significantly reducing the amount of illegal opiates entering the international market, and not to exceed \$34,000,000 for the fiscal year 1977".

22 USC 2291.

(b) Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no officer or employee of the United States may engage or participate in any direct police arrest action in any foreign country with respect to narcotics control efforts.

"(2) The President shall carry out a study with respect to methods through which United States narcotics control programs in foreign countries might be placed under the auspices of international or regional organizations. The results of such study shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate not later than June 30, 1977."

Study, trans-  
mitted to  
Speaker of the  
House and  
President of  
the Senate.

AUTHORIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

22 USC 2222.

SEC. 505. Section 302 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(i) In addition to amounts otherwise available under this section, there are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1976 \$1,000,000 and for fiscal year 1977 \$2,000,000 to be available only for the International Atomic Energy Agency to be used for the purpose of strengthening safeguards and inspections relating to nuclear fissile facilities and materials. Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended."

INTERIM QUARTER AUTHORIZATIONS


22 USC 2162  
note.

SEC. 506. (a) Any authorization of appropriations in this Act, or in any amendment to any other law made by this Act, for the fiscal year 1976, shall be deemed to include an additional authorization of appropriations for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, in amounts which equal one-fourth of any amount authorized for the fiscal year 1976 and in accordance with the authorities applicable to operations and activities authorized under this Act or such other law, unless appropriations for the same purpose are specifically authorized in a law hereinafter enacted.

22 USC 2751  
note,  
Amte, p. 734,  
22 USC 2764.

(b) The aggregate total of credits, including participations in credits, extended pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and of the principal amount of loans guaranteed pursuant to section 24(a) of such Act during the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending Sep-

# U.S. MARINE CORPS DRUG USE



# USMC COUNTER-NARCOTICS JUNIOR LEADER PROGRAM

## GOAL

TO ASSIST IN THE U.S. EFFORT  
TO DEVELOP PRODUCTIVE CITIZENS  
WHO ARE DRUG FREE

## TARGET

- 16-20 YEARS OLD
- UNDERPRIVILEGED
- POORLY EDUCATED
- NON-CONVICTED/  
CONVICTED

# NATIONAL JUNIOR LEADERS PROGRAM

## 1ST PHASE (MILITARY STYLE)

NON-CONVICTED  
JROTC "BOOT" CAMP  
(9WKS)

- MODIFIED MILITARY PROGRAM
- REMEDIAL MATH/ENGLISH
- ENGLISH AS A SECOND LANGUAGE
- DRUG REHABILITATION PROGRAM

OUTWARD BOUND CAMP  
(7WKS)

- CONFIDENCE PROGRAM
- LEADERSHIP PROGRAM
- ENDURANCE PROGRAM

CONVICTED  
STATE SPONSORED  
SHOCK-INCARCERATION  
CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY

- TRAINING STANDARDS
- STANDARDIZED PROGRAM
- DEFINITIVE CRITERIA
- REDUCED SENTENCES



MINIMAL  
SECURITY



# NATIONAL JUNIOR LEADERS PROGRAM

## 2ND PHASE

### CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CAMP(CIVIL/MILITARY)

GREEN TEAM  
ENVIRONMENTAL  
PROGRAM

INTERMURAL/RECREATION  
PROGRAM

PRELIMINARY EDUCATION  
PROGRAM

-REMEDIAL EDUCATION

-DRY REHABILITATION

-GED PREP COURSES



PROBATION

# NATIONAL JUNIOR LEADERS PROGRAM

## 3RD PHASE(CIVIL)-COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

### MILITARY ENLISTED

- COMBAT ARMS
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS
- G.I. BILL

### COMMUNITY COLLEGE PROGRAM

- ASSOC ARTS DEGREE
- TECHNICAL TRAINING
- STATE FUNDED SCHOLARSHIPS
- USE EXISTING UNIVERSITIES

### DRUG REHABILITATION CENTERS

- ADVANCED THERAPY FACILITIES

### APPRENTICE TRADE PROGRAM

- LABOR UNION SCHOOLS
- TRADE SCHOOLS

### JROTC PROGRAM

- EXTENDED/FUNDED INNER-CITY



PAROLED

# NATIONAL JUNIOR LEADERS PROGRAM

## 4TH PHASE (CIVIL)

### COMMUNITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM

- U.S. DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (USDA)
- TAX FREE ZONES IN INNER CITIES FOR INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT
- MED CAP PROGRAMS
- MASSIVE REBUILDING OF INNER CITY STRUCTURE (SCHOOLS, HOUSING, FACILITIES)
- TAX FREE WORK BASE



PRODUCTIVE U.S. CITIZEN



PARDONED  
EXONERATED





HV 5825 .U57 1989  
United States. Marine Corps.  
Counter-Drug Working Group.  
Report on the U.S. Marine  
Corps role in the nation's

28 MAY 1989

DEC 23 2000

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